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Abstract. Twelve incidents involving well casing and/or cement leaks in the salt caverns storage industry are
described. These incidents occurred at the following storage sites: Eminence salt dome, Mississippi; Elk City,
Oklahoma; Conway, Kansas; Yoder, Kansas; Mont Belvieu, Texas; Teutschenthal/Bad Lauchsta¨dt, Germany;
Clute, Texas; Mineola, Texas; Hutchinson, Kansas; Magnolia, Louisiana; Boling, Texas; Epe, Germany. Mech-
anisms leading to a casing leak and consequences are discussed. In most cases, a breach in a steel casing occurred
at a depth where a single casing was isolating the stored product from the geological formations. The origin of
the breach was due in most cases to poor welding/screwing conditions and corrosion, or excessive deformation
of the rock formation. In this, the age of the well is often inﬂuential. In many cases, the leak path does not open
directly at ground level; fugitive hydrocarbons ﬁrst escape and accumulate in the subsurface prior to migrating
through shallower horizons and escaping at ground surface. A pressure differential between hydrocarbons in the
borehole and ﬂuids in the rock mass favours fast leak rates. A wellhead pressure drop often is observed, even
when the stored product is natural gas. The incidents described suggest that thorough monitoring (tightness
tests) and a correct well design would lessen considerably the probability of a casing leak occurring.
1 Introduction
Prompted in part by projects related to carbon dioxide
(CO2) sequestration in which long-term tightness is crucial,
there has been an increasing interest in the tightness of
hydrocarbon (oil and gas) storage wells. In addition, high
proﬁle incidents, such as the 2015 Aliso Canyon blow-out,
in California, have raised public awareness. The Aliso
Canyon incident involved amassive gas leak from a depleted
reservoir natural gas storage facility, the cause of which was
a failure of the production tubing in a production well at
around 2577 m (8450 ft) and consecutive leak from the well
at a shallower depth (around 134 m, or 440 ft; California
Council on Science and Technology, 2018).
This paper focuses on hydrocarbon storage facilities
using salt caverns, access to which in most cases is through
a single well or, more rarely, through a number of wells.
These wells are of similar design and construction to those
used in the oil and gas industry. Salt caverns are almost per-
fectly tight and for this reason, as in most pressure vessels,
the tightness problem is with the ‘‘piping’’ connecting the
cavern to surface, i.e., the completion (casing and tubing)
and cementation of the wells.
Research and innovation on cementation have been
ongoing since the early days of oil and gas production. How-
ever, challenging hurdles are still being faced. The effects of
a better cement quality, of better cementing procedures or
of more stringent regulations cannot be easily assessed,
through simple and unequivocal criteria; in case of an inci-
dent or accident, the post mortem analysis is difﬁcult as the
origin of the leak is several hundreds or even thousands of
metres below ground level. Drawing experience from real
life takes time. One possible approach is based upon epi-
demiological principles, i.e., the statistical analysis of the
largest number of cases and identiﬁcation of correlations.
In a study of data for 315 000 oil, gas and injection wells
held by EUB, the regulatory agency in Alberta, Canada,
Watson and Bachu (2007) discussed the results of two
mandatory tests for wells, which have been required since
1995. The tests, undertaken within 60 days of drilling rig
releaseandprior towell abandonment, are theSurfaceCasing
Vent Flow (SCVF) test, and the Gas Migration (GM) test,
which provides at least a ﬁrst indication of well tightness.
The paper focused on abandoned rather than active wells.
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and there is a risk, as for any statistical analysis, that the rela-
tion between causes and consequences remains ambiguous.
Data analysis shows that there is a correlation between
SCVF/GM results and oil price (with higher price comes
the incentive to drill more wells, or more difﬁcult wells,
although equipment and skilled workforce are scarcer), geo-
graphic locationand technology or regulatory changes.Addi-
tional inﬂuential factors are wellbore deviation, well type
(drilled and abandoned wells have leakage occurrence rates
smaller than cased and abandoned wells) abandonment
method (wells inwhich a cement plugwas placed across com-
pleted intervals has better results thanbridge-pluggedwells).
Low cement top and exposed casings were found to be the
most important indicator for SCVF/GM poor results.
Nicot (2009) surveyed abandoned oil and gas wells in
the Texas Gulf Coast, drawing a list of factors, which are
favourable for long-term tightness. The abandonment year
is of special signiﬁcance, as innovations were progressively
introduced: Use of centralizers (1930), caliper surveys
(1940), tagging of the cement plug, introduction of
improved cement additives adapted to temperature, pres-
sure, and chemical-speciﬁc conditions (1940), improvement
of the quality of material used in well construction and
abandonment. Nicot also outlines the promulgation of both
speciﬁc plugging instructions by the Texas RailRoad Com-
mission (In 1934, the RRC promulgated speciﬁc plugging
instructions, and did so again in 1967.) and the Drinking
Water Act, publication of API national standards (starting
1953), increased scrutiny by the State (after 1983) and
certiﬁcation of plugging operators (1997). Nicot points
out that problems lie in the plugging/abandonment perfor-
mance rather than in the quality of the material used.
In a survey of new gas wells in the US, Miyazaki (2009)
suggested that up to 10% of the wells leaked. More speciﬁc
to natural gas storages, Marlow (1989) undertook a survey
covering some 6953 wells operated by twenty American Gas
Association member companies. He mentions that:
‘‘Tests show that even when the most up-to-date
cement types and techniques are used, leakage can
and will occur in a signiﬁcant number of cases’’
(p. 1151).
The number of wells with a known operation lifetime
duration until the leakage was detected was 426 (6%),
among which 77% leaked in less than 30 days (it is likely
that they were rapidly repaired). Leakages at greater than
10 injection/withdrawal cycles occurred in only 2.6% of
cases. The only statistically signiﬁcant correlating variables
are depth and bottom-hole pressure. Wells that leak tend to
be deeper (>4500 ft, or 1375 m) and have higher pressures
(>3000 psig, or 21 MPa).
In this paper a different approach is adopted. The paper
draws on a report prepared by Re´veille`re et al. (2017) for
the Solution Mining Institute (SMRI), representing a col-
laborative effort to gather and explain all wellhead failure,
overﬁlling, or casing leaks incidents in the salt caverns stor-
age industry; provided that public information was avail-
able, reliable and precise enough to gain a satisfactory
understanding of the event. This analysis builds on 12 cases,
whereas the SMRI report detailed 21, in order to focus our
analysis on casing leaks incidents (overﬁlling and wellhead
failure are not considered in this paper). Cases which were
not considered in the SMRI report imply breaches at the
cavern walls, operational problems or surface piping failure.
Additionally, two cases in the SMRI report – Conway and
Yoder, Kansas – were merged in the present article. Hence
the fact that 11 cases are presented, instead of 21 in the
SMRI report.
The twelve cases of loss of tightness in salt caverns due
to a leak through or along the cemented casing are
described brieﬂy in the ﬁrst part of this paper. The second
part, draws general lessons learned from these cases.
2 Case histories
2.1 Eminence salt dome, Mississippi, 1970, 2004
and 2010–2011
The Eminence salt dome is located 20 km (12 miles) north-
west of Hattiesburg, Mississippi. The top of the salt is
between 730 and 743 m (2400–2440 ft); it is overlain by a
150-m thick cap-rock of limestone and anhydrite. In 1991,
this natural gas storage site comprised seven caverns.
Caverns #1–#4 were certiﬁcated in the early 1970’s and
caverns 5, 6 and 7 in 1991. These caverns are especially deep,
from 1725 m to 2000 m in the case of Cavern #1 (Fig. 1).
For those wells drilled in the 1970s, a 3000 surface casing
was set and cemented at 50 ft. A 2800 hole was then drilled
to 2700 ft (823 m) and a 2000 OD cemented casing set, and
the last cemented casing shoe, diameter 133—8 00, was at
1737 m (5700 ft) depth (Allen, 1971, 1972). Cavern #1
was ﬁlled with gas at a 7 MPa (1000 psi) pressure over a
period of 2 months, after which it was increased to 28 MPa
(or 4000 psi; geostatic stress at cavern depth is 38–45 MPa).
After a second pressure cycle, the ‘‘cavity bottom was at
1953 m (6408 ft), showing a loss of 46 m (152 ft) in about
Fig. 1. Extent of salt creep and decrease in cavern size for
Eminence Cavern #1, as determined from cavern sonar surveys
in 1970 and 1972. Based upon and redrawn from Allen (1972);
Baar (1977); Coates et al. (1981); Be´rest and Brouard (2003).
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two years’’ (Baar, 1977; Coates et al., 1981) and cavern
volume loss was 40% (Fig. 1). Once the problem was recog-
nised, reduced losses were achieved through various
measures, including maintaining a higherminimum pressure
over extended time periods and less dewatering.
In 2004, Cavern #4 well casing failed at a depth of
1639.5 m (5379 ft; Wellinghoff et al., 2013), i.e., a few doz-
ens of feet above cavern roof. The company took Cavern #4
out of service, ﬁlling it with water and shutting it in. On
December 26, 2010, a large, unexpected pressure drop of
2.5 MPa (357 psi) in one minute was detected in Cavern
#3. The initial response to the leak was to ﬂow ~8.65 mcm
(306 MMcf) of gas into the pipeline system. Another gas
leak from the wellhead of Cavern #3 was accompanied by
water shooting into the air from on-site water wells. On
January 4, 2011, the company began ﬂaring gas from
Cavern #3, until its production tubing became clogged
with debris. Gas was also escaping from the ground around
the wellhead of Cavern #1. A large cave-in occurred, seal-
ing off the ﬂow. The company began drilling monitoring
wells in the surrounding freshwater zones. By January 24,
2011, the decision was made to take Caverns #1 and #3
out of service. Later, a leak to the caprock was detected
in Cavern #7 and maximum operating pressure was low-
ered from 24.8 MPa to 19.1 MPa (3600 psi–2775 psi).
Investigations revealed that leakage in Cavern #3 well
likely arose through salt creep leading to overstretching of
the casings above the cavern, where displacements due to
creep closure were especially intense (Wellinghoff et al.,
2013). These excessive strains led to damage of steel casings
and/or steel-cement and cement-rock interfaces, as a result
of which, gas migrated up the well to the cap-rock and
ultimately to surface.
2.2 Elk City, Oklahoma, 1973
On February 23, 1973, the Oklahoma Geological Survey
was informed that a central crater about 10 m by 15 m
(30 ft by 50 ft) by 6 m (20 ft) deep, plus 20 m–50 m
(160 ft–360 ft) -long pressure cracks radiating from the cra-
ter, had appeared in level grassland, about 8 km (5 miles)
south of Elk City, Oklahoma. Siltstone blocks of 20–45 kg
(50–100 pounds) were thrown as far as 23 m (75 ft) away,
and several 30-ton boulders were lifted to an upright posi-
tion (Fig. 2, left), and 5 m (15 ft) tall trees in the vicinity
were tilted 45. On March 1, 1973, gas samples were taken
at the blow-out site. Analyses revealed 1% total hydrocar-
bons, of which 75% was propane, a result excluding any
natural origin. A leak from a propane salt storage cavern
leached out from the upper part of the Permian Blaine
formation was suspected. Several investigations and tests
were undertaken at that site. A 13-hour observation period
with the cavern maintained at constant halmostatic pres-
sure was performed (i.e., with the inner tubing ﬁlled with
saturated brine and opened at the surface). This test found
a 30-gal/day (5 L/h) apparent leak in the cavern (such a
test is not fully conclusive as phenomena other than a leak
can explain such an outﬂow). The storage cavern was emp-
tied, with the propane being displaced from the cavern by
brine on March 28. The two inner strings were retrieved
and checked for ﬂaws (Fig. 3). A cement-bond survey was
run to assess cementing around the 10-3=400 casing string.
The survey demonstrated that the lower 60 m (200 ft),
from about 341 m to 411 m (1120 ft–1347 ft), in which a
special resin cement had been used, was well bonded and
that the upper 341 m (1120 ft) was poorly bonded. This
strongly suggested that the leak was between 35.5 m and
340 m, a zone in which the well was equipped with a single
cemented casing (instead of two casings above 35.5 m).
As illustrated in Figure 3, liqueﬁed gas would have leaked
through a weak point in the well casing, migrated upwards
in the poorly cemented annulus until it reached the Doxey
shales. From there it would have migrated laterally to the
blow-out site 700 m away from the wellhead and at 23 m
lower elevation. The liquid LPG pressure would have
decrease along the migration, triggering LPG vaporization
at some point. The mechanical energy liberated by the
vaporization generated the crater and cracks observed at
the surface.
Both retrieved strings were then run back into the well
with a packer added for isolating the 700 · 103=400 annulus at
365 m (1197 ft). This annulus was ﬁlled with inert water
and tested for leaks (Fig. 3). No leak was detected and
neither did a pressure test on the cavern prove any leakage.
The storage well was returned to service on April 23, 1973.
There were no later reported leakages similar to the one
that led to the blow-out, suggesting that the breach depth
was located above 365 m depth, a zone now covered by two
casings and a monitoring annulus.
2.3 Conway-Yoder cavern ﬁeld (Hutchinson salt
formation), Kansas, 1980 and 2000
Over 600 solution-mined salt storage caverns are located in
Kansas. Nearly 50% of these are near Conway, a small town
in eastern Kansas, where underground storage of Natural
Gas Liquids (NGLs) began in 1951. Evidence of fugitive
NGLs was known as early as 1956 (Ratigan et al., 2002).
Propane was detected in several operators and domestic
wells, ultimately leading to the relocation of residents and
demolition of the properties.
The Hutchinson Salt Member of the Permian
Wellington Formation from which the storage caverns were
leached out, is shallow (around 120 m (400 ft); Fig. 3). It is
overlain by two impervious shale formations (Ninnescah
and Wellington shale formations), above which lies the
Quaternary Equus Beds Aquifer, a source of potable water.
The eastern boundary of the Hutchinson Salt Member is a
dissolution boundary (Fig. 4).
In December 2000, fugitive NGLs were encountered in a
recently drilled cathodic protection at the Williams Conway
Underground East (CUE) storage facility, which includes
71 caverns. Within a 1.6 km (1-mile) radius of this well,
all wells (water, oil, observation) were investigated. NGLs
were encountered in two more wells near brine recovery
wells. The 71 operating wells were evaluated through pres-
sure monitoring and temperature logs. As of March 15,
2002, nearly all the wells have been evaluated and none
have been found to be a contributor to the fugitive NL
occurrence. Cement bond logs run in the wells revealed that
casing cement-bonds were poor.
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A similar incident occurred on June 30, 1980 near
Yoder, Kansas, 9.7 km (6 miles) south of Hutchinson and
48 km (30 miles) south of Conway. A propane blow-out
occurred along the shoulder of a county road. Bryson
(1980) reported:
‘‘Groundwater and sand were blown ﬁfteen to
twenty feet into the air. Within twenty-four hours,
the pressure of the propane in hole had abated.
Within a week, the surface of the water in the blow-
out conduit was placid, however propane vapors con-
tinued to rise up through clay and silt surrounding
the hole’’.
In 2004, Johnson and Hofﬁne presented an update of
the Conway investigations:
‘‘The results of the investigation indicated a plume of
NGL located east of the Brine Production Test Well
Willems No. 1. Geophysical logging of the Brine Pro-
duction Test Well Willems No. 1 and adjacent Brine
Production Well indicated poor cement bond along
the casings. Subsequent abandonment of the Brine
Production Well Willems No. 1 and recompletion of
the Brine Production Test Well Willems No. 1 have
resulted in a rapid and signiﬁcant decrease in the con-
centration of NGLs in the adjacent shallow Monitor-
ing Well CUE01-6S’’.
2.4 Mont Belvieu, Texas, 1980
This accident occurred in 1980 at Barber’s Hill, near Mont
Belvieu, Texas, where a salt dome is home to 134 solution-
mined caverns (and 135 wells) used primarily for Liqueﬁed
Petroleum Gas (LPG) storage and distribution and for
brine production (Ratigan, 2009).
On September 17, 1980 a pressure drop was recorded at
the wellhead of one of the salt caverns containing LPG.
On October 3, a spark from an electrical appliance ignited
gas (70% ethane, 30% propane) that had accumulated in
the foundation of a house in the area, causing an explosion;
there were no casualties. The cavern in which the pressure
had dropped was emptied and ﬁlled with brine. In the days
that followed, gas appeared haphazardly around the area,
and 50 families had to be evacuated. Holes were drilled into
the water table above the salt to ﬁnd and vent the gas.
Investigations proved (Fig. 5) that gas had leaked through
a breach in the well casing – which was 22 years old – at
caprock depth. Depths to caprock and to salt are 100 m
(350 ft) and 300 m (1000 ft, respectively (Be´rest and
Brouard, 2003; Pirkle, 1986).
2.5 Teutschenthal/Bad Lauchsta¨dt, Germany, 1988
The Teutschenthal/Bad Lauchsta¨dt storage site is located
ﬃ40-km (26 miles) west of Leipzig, central Germany
(Fig. 6), Arnold et al. (2010). Bedded rock salt (halite)
deposits lie at a depth of 500 m–1000 m (1500–3000 ft),
with the thickness of the halite increasing to the SE, from
less than 50 m to more than 500 m. The overburden com-
prises 300 m (1000 ft) of argillaceous rocks overlain by a
110 m (360 ft) thickness of an alternating sandstone and
mudstone sequence (Fig. 7).
The well Ug Lt 5/71 was drilled and completed in 1971,
within which the last cemented 11-3—8 00 casing shoe was set
at 726.4 m (2382 ft) depth, and the intermediate 16-3—8 00 cas-
ing shoe depth at 92.1 m (302 ft) (Fig. 7). The cavern, with
a volume of 40 000 m3, was used to store ethylene. On
March 29, 1988, a drop in pressure in the ethylene annulus
of cavern Ug Lt 5/71 from 7.5 MPa to 4 MPa was
observed. One hour later, the ﬁrst eruption of an ethylene
– water mixture took place 50 m (165 ft) away from the
well and was followed by additional eruptions in a North-
West direction and 250 m (800 ft) southward, close to the
neighboring cavern Ug Lt 6/71 (Fig. 6). Elongated chim-
neys formed, from ejected debris and partly pulsating ethy-
lene-water fountains, aligned along parallel WNW-ESE
Fig. 2. Central crater (left, from Fay, 1973a) and one of the pressure cracks (right, from Fay, 1973b) discovered on February 23,
1973.
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lines. The emission of ethylene continued for several days
until an estimated 60–80% of the cavern volume was
released. An area of 8 km2 was evacuated.
Ethylene outﬂow decreased rapidly. Immediately after
the start of the eruption elevation surveys revealed an
NW-SE trending ellipsoid uplift of 0.2 m (0.7 ft). Fractures
and crevasses, displaced concrete road pads, and fractures
were found in a building at the crest of this uplift. This
enabled an estimate of uplift prior to the blow-outs as
around 0.5 m (1.7 ft).
Subsequent downhole surveys found a damaged connec-
tion to the 11-3—4 00 casing at a depth of 111.8 m, from which
ethylene escaped and accumulated in a sandstone layer
between 100 and 140 m depth. The sandstone lies below a
25-m thick impervious layer, which was uplifted and led to
overstretching and failure of the 11-3—4 00 casing, ultimately
resulting in a massive release of ethylene on March 29th.
2.6 Clute, Texas, 1988
This storage cavern facility was constructed in the Stratton
Ridge Salt Dome about 1.6 km (1 mile) NE of Clute in
south Brazoria County, 25 km (15 miles) SSW of Houston,
Texas. Several hundred oil and gas wells drilled across the
salt diapir have established its shape and structure. The
caprock is several hundred feet thick, comprising lime-
stones, gypsum and anhydrite beds and the diapir shows
an unusual geometry, including a large structural depres-
sion in the eastern third of the dome. This and the features
and problems associated with the caprock, which are most
likely caused by active salt movement, indicate that the
internal salt structure is complex and still evolving. The
internal structure and fabric of the salt is thus likely to
inﬂuence construction and operation of any storage caverns
(Lord et al., 2006).
Fig. 3. State of the well before and after the incident, probable leakpath (in red) and summary of the main investigations.
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On December 27, 1988, company ofﬁcials advised the
Rail Road Commission of Texas that they were aware
ethylene had been lost from a storage cavern. By December
30, it was assessed that the loss amounted to 1850 m3
(0.5 million gallons). Water wells in the area were tested
but found no contamination (Toth, 1989a). It was decided
to drill an exploratory well near the site to try and discover
the whereabouts of the escaped ethylene and perhaps
attempt recovery of some (Toth, 1989b, 1990). The ﬁrst test
well was drilled on March 19th 1989 and the fugitive ethy-
lene was immediately located. The escaped product was
ﬂared off and continued to be so until at least April 1990
(Toth, 1990).
Company ofﬁcials said the casing failure could have
been caused by movement in the salt formation with pro-
duct having escaped at around 396 m (1300 ft) depth.
2.7 Mineola, Texas, 2000
This incident occurred in 2000, at the Mineola Storage
Terminal about 145 km (90 miles) east of Dallas, Texas
(Warren, 2006). Its cause and how the resultant ﬁre was
extinguished was described by Gebhardt et al. (2001).
The facility had two storage caverns the wells to which were
originally drilled as oil producers in the late 1950s. One cav-
ern, the volume of which was 49 000 m3 (13 million gallons)
of propane, suffered loss of product. Well completion
included an 8-5—8 00 casing set at 484 m (1584 ft). The shoe
of the 5-1—2 00 tubing string was 720 m (2400 ft) deep, 30 m
(100 ft) above the cavern bottom; it seems that undersatu-
rated water, rather than brine, was used as an injection
ﬂuid. The cavern well developed a casing leak at an unde-
termined depth. According to Gebhardt et al., 2001, the
‘‘initial’’ theory was that injection of undersaturated water
led to dissolution and thinning of the salt pillar (wall)
between the caverns; a leak was created when a workover
was run on the second cavern, where nitrogen was being
used in the workover to ensure that there was no LPG in
the tubing. The pressure induced in the workover well
caused fracturing in the salt pillar. In this theory, the pres-
sure surge was transmitted to the cavern in LPG causing a
breach in its well casing. Propane escaped from the well and
Fig. 5. Conceptual sketch of an LPG leak from the Mont
Belvieu cavern (from Be´rest and Brouard, 2003).
Fig. 6. Aerial photo of the site on April 3rd 1988 showing
location of the well, the settlement area of Teutschenthal,
alignment of eruptions and close up of main eruption fracture.
Right side showing fault zones and area of uplift as dashed lines
and elevation measuring points as squares. Based upon and
modiﬁed from Katzung et al. (1996).
Fig. 4. West-East cross-section of the Williams-CUE Facility
(After Ratigan et al., 2002).
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migrated upwards, eventually escaping through surface
soils to the atmosphere. It collected in low-lying areas
around the terminal and surrounding forest and found an
ignition source. The water-bearing shallow water sand
was ﬁlled with LPG. A water well used to supply water
for cavern leaching located approximately 50 ft (15 m)
from the product withdrawal well was ﬁrst to ignite and
burn. This was followed by the cavern wellhead. Propane
escaped through the soil up to 30 m (100 ft) from the well
itself. Fireﬁghters inferred from the behaviour of the ﬁre
that the casing leak was at shallow depth. Considerable
efforts were required to extinguish the ﬁre.
2.8 Hutchinson, Kansas, 2001
On January 17, 2001, at 10:45 am, a sudden release of
natural gas burst from the ground under a store and a
neighboring shop in downtown Hutchinson, a town with
40 000 inhabitants in Kansas. Within minutes, the building
was ablaze. During the afternoon of the same day, eight
brine and natural-gas geysers began bubbling up, 3–5 km
(2–3 miles) east of the downtown ﬁre, some reaching 10-m
(30-ft) in height, two of the geysers igniting. The next
day, natural gas coming up from such a long-forgotten brine
well exploded beneath a mobile home, killing two people.
Also on January 17, 15 min after the ﬁrst downtown
blast and 13 km (8 miles) northwest of downtown
Hutchinson, technicians from the Yaggy natural-gas
storage recorded a gas-pressure drop of 0.7 MPa (100 psi)
in the S-1 salt cavern, whose casing shoe was 239 m
(794 ft) below ground level. The underground storage facil-
ity was developed in the 1980s to hold propane. The owner
became bankrupt, and the wells were plugged by partially
ﬁlling them with cement. In the early 1990s the site was
converted to a natural-gas storage. A link between the pres-
sure drop and the events in Hutchinson was suspected
immediately, even though the distance between the storage
and the downtown geysers [10–12 km (7–8 miles)] set a
puzzling geological and reservoir engineering problem.
A plug was set at the bottom of the S-1 well and a downhole
video run. This revealed a large curved slice in the casing at
a depth of about 180 m (585 ft). It was suspected that var-
ious metal objects, including a steel casing coupler, had
been dropped down the well when the former storage was
abandoned. During the well re-opening, when the cement
and cast-iron plugs were drilled, the system composed of
the drill bit and dropped metal objects cut a slice ‘‘like a
kitchen knife cutting into a can’’ in the 900 (23-cm) casing
of the S-1 cavern at about the depth [179 m (595 ft)] of
the later leak. Gas moved vertically up the outside of the
casing from the breach until it reached a fractured gypsifer-
ous/dolomitic horizon (G on Fig. 8) at the top of the
Wellington Shale Formation. At this point the gas migrated
laterally updip to the east towards Hutchinson, remaining
trapped between two impermeable shale layers, where it
encountered the abandoned brine wells. Most of these were
only cased down to a shallow aquifer. Clear evidence of the
existence of multiple independent channels within the dolo-
mite layer is suggested by the occurrence of a dozen geysers
during the 24-h period following the ﬁrst blow-out. The gey-
sers appeared in the west and then progressively eastwards,
and vented the accumulation of gas under the city, until no
further gas eruptions occurred. In the following weeks, a
number of seismic reﬂection lines were acquired to try to
locate the gas migration path, and 36 venting wells were
drilled. Only eight of them hit gas, supporting the view that
migration of gas to surface occurred along narrow pathways
or channels within the dolomite layer (Allison, 2001).
After 1997, the State had authorized a 17.5% maximum
pressure increase, raising the maximum pressure at the
casing shoe (239 m to 794 ft deep) to 4.78 MPa (693 psi).
This additional storage capacity remained largely unused
for years on Cavern S1. Early in January 2001, gas was
Fig. 7. Casing program and top-hole geology of Ug Lt 5/71.
Based upon and modiﬁed from Katzung et al. (1996).
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injected and the pressure jumped from 2.9 MPa (426 psi) to
4.76 MPa (691 psi) at 6 a.m. on January 14. The pressure
gradient was then 2.66 · 102 MPa/m (1.18 psi/ft) at leak
depth on January 14 and gas pressure was above the over-
burden pressure. The pressure began to drop at the well-
head, a move that, with hindsight, may be interpreted as
a clear sign of increasing leak rate. The pressure build-up
spread throughout the gas-ﬁlled fractured channels, ulti-
mately reaching that of hydrostatic pressure beneath the
Hutchinson area.
After the accident, poor regulation and, when compared
to other states, the small number of inspection staff inKansas
state, were implicated by several experts (e.g., Ratigan,
2001). New sets of regulations were discussed and imposed
(Johnson, 2002). These included mandatory double casing
in wells, corrosion control, restrictions on well-conversion
(salt caverns designed to store LPG could not be converted
to store natural gas, and cavernwells that have been plugged
cannot be reopened and reused), a maximum pressure gradi-
ent of 0.76 psi/ft (1.73 · 102 MPa/m) at the production
casing shoe, and new testing requirements (with a Mechani-
cal Integrity Test (MIT) performed every 5 years).
2.9 Magnolia, Louisiana, 2003
The natural gas storage facility of Magnolia is located at
Grand Bayou, Louisiana, where several other storage and
brine production caverns are operational. Salt roof is
200 m (600 ft) deep. In 2003, the facility included Caverns
#13 and #14, drilled in the 1970’s. On November 1,
operations started ﬁlling the caverns with natural gas.
On December 24, an underground gas leak led to the release
of about 9.9 MNm3 (0.35 billions ft3) in a matter of hours.
The gas migrated to an adjacent aquifer and then to the
atmosphere. On December 29, cavern operations were
suspended and 30 residents were evacuated. The wells were
plugged and 36 vent wells were installed in the aquifer over
the salt dome, of which 17 collected or burned off gas.
Downhole videos were run in the wells. Several theories
were put forward to explain the gas leak from around
440 m (1450 ft) below the surface. Causes of the leak were
considered to be: crushed casings (EIA, 2006), cracks in the
casing (Edgar, 2005; Hopper, 2004), separation of three or
four 13-3—8 00 casings connections permitting gas to leak
behind the casing and then to the surface (Nations, 2005),
or improper back-welding that resulted in cracks in the well
casing (State of Louisiana, 2007). Video of Well #13 is
reported as showing cracks in the casing near a coupling;
the well had been plugged at the point of the lowest crack,
after which the leakage stopped, which pointed to the
cracks as a possible cause of the leaks.
2.10 Boling, Texas, 2005
Four caverns had been solution-mined and ﬁlled with natu-
ral gas between 1980 and 1983 in the Boling Dome near
Boling, Wharton County, Texas. Depth to the caprock is
globally about 192 m (630 ft), and the top of the salt occurs
at a depth of around 305 m (1000 ft). Cavern roof depths
are between 1066 and 1083 m (3497 and 3553 ft), except
for Cavern #3, the roof of which is deeper by 45–60 m
(150–200 ft). Apart from Cavern #3, 11-3—8 00 casing shoe
Fig. 8. Hutchinson leak pathway. Quaternary alluvions are composed of sands and gravels, 50-ft thick. Elevations are in feet. Below
are the Permian Ninnescah Shale, the Upper Wellington Shale and the Hutchinson Salt member. The gas-bearing interval ranges from
270-ft deep in the east side of the city to 400-ft deep several miles northwest of the city; the dip is 20 ft per mile. Gas migrated through
fractured dolomite layers (G-G). (Kansas Geological Survey Web Site, 2001).
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is close to the cavern roofs (0–18 m [0–59 ft] above), which
are ﬂat (Fig. 9).
In the Fall of 2005, Cavern #4 was nearly full. An
abnormally fast pressure drop was observed, which was
monitored over a period of several weeks. Temperature log-
gings found cold spots in Caverns #1, #2 and #4, raising
the possibility of a production casing leak not far above
the cavern roof. During gas removal, the three caverns were
ﬁlled with water.
Detailed investigations into the incident were under-
taken, including running downhole video camera logs,
which identiﬁed casing collar and coupling partings for over
100 m above the casing shoe depth (Fig. 10). The video log
revealed that the casing had failed at eight different loca-
tions, always near or at a connection. Failure often was a
circumferential fracture. The casing being dragged down
after it fractured, up to 60 cm height of cement could be
observed in between the two parts of the fractured casing.
Fracture shape, the absence of any failure in Cavern #3
the chimney which was 60-m in height, and ﬂat roofs,
strongly suggest that casings were overstretched above cav-
ern roofs and experienced tensile failure. This was conﬁrmed
by numerical analyses, that clearly showed the cemented
casings of Wells #1, #2 and #4 were not able to accommo-
date the resulting large tensile salt strains, and their ulti-
mate strength limit was exceeded (Fig. 11).
The well repair procedure for the three leaking wells
included milling a 30 m (100 ft) section from the original
11-3—8 00 casing and cementing a 10-3—400 welded liner. The
new casing shoe, 30 m higher than the original one, was
therefore in a zone where simulations suggest the strain
induced by the salt creep should stay below the casings
strength, thanks to this new 30 m long cavern neck.
2.11 Epe, Germany, 2014
At the Epe site, 80 km (5 miles) north of Dortmund,
Germany, several dozens of salt caverns have been leached-
out froma 200–400 m (656–1312 ft) thick sequence of halites
overlain by clastic and argillaceous rocks; top of salt can be
found at a 1000-m (3281 ft) depth. The Epe S5 cavern is
147 m (482 ft) in height, with a diameter of 82 m (269 ft)
and volume of approximately 450 000 m3 (2.7 mbbls).
In 1980, approximately 408 000 m3 (2.45 mbbls) of oil were
injected into storage. The cavern operated in brine-
compensated mode, with brine injected or produced through
a 7-5—8 00 string to displace the crude oil through the 11-3—4 00 ·
7-5—8 00 annulus. The last 11-3—4 00 casing is anchored at a
1086.8 m (3566 ft) depth and the penultimate 1600 cemented
casing at a 212 m (696 ft) depth. Typical of a strategic oil
reserve, it experienced only a small number of withdrawals
or injections.
On February 23rd and 24th 2014, a pressure drop of
0.36 MPa (52 psi) was recorded in the annular space of
Cavern S5. The cavern was taken out of operation and a
number of inspection runs were performed in the well.
These did not indicate any evidence of a leakage. The min-
ing authorities agreed to commence operation again on
April 2nd 2014 with restrictions regarding the maximum
pressure.
On April 12th 2014, an oil seep was discovered at sur-
face in a meadow. On April 15th, two more spills developed
close to a farm, inducing a family to leave their home for
some days. After ﬁrst analysis of the locations of the spills,
it became clear that the origin of the crude oil was Cavern
S5. The cavern was made safe and multiple efforts were
undertaken to understand the reasons for the leakage,
assess the extent of the leakage, minimize its impact and,
ultimately, restore cavern integrity.
Investigations and computations suggested that cavern
convergence, evidenced by subsidence measurements at
ground level, caused movement of the rock mass (salt) sur-
rounding Cavern S5, especially at a depth of 217 m (712 ft;
Fig. 12). The calculated vertical strain at a depth of 200 m
(656 ft) is approx. 0.1–0.2 mm/m, enough to trigger a sig-
niﬁcant displacement on the casing connection at 217 m
(712 ft). Above 212 m (~696 ft), the completion, including
the 1600 casing, is much stiffer and stronger than the one-
casing section below and it was concluded that the ﬁrst cas-
ing connection below the 1600 casing shoe was a critical point
for structural damage.
Fig. 9. General cross-sections of caverns, based on sonar data.
From Osnes et al. (2007)
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At a depth of 217 m (712 ft), crude oil pressure was
8.1 MPa and capillary entrance pressure of the enclosing
argillaceous series (mudstones) was approximately 4.7 MPa
(682 psi). Pre-existing shear zones and fractures in the sur-
rounding rocks re-opened, along which the crude oil
migrated as the permeability of the matrix is too low for
oil penetration. Upon reaching the base of the Quaternary
series, the crude oil migrated into a shallow, groundwater
aquifer and ultimately reached the surface.
As a result of this incident, and as is already the case in
the Netherlands, it is expected that to prevent that kind of
incident in future, the regulations for operating storage cav-
erns in Germany will require a double barrier installation
for all wells (Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, 2014; Coldewey
and Wesche, 2015; Kukla and Urai, 2015).
3 Analysis
3.1 Leaks main characteristics
3.2 Lessons drawn from incidents
Tables 1–3 provide the main characteristics of 11 incidents,
which can be described as leaks through the casing. We do
not claim the list is comprehensive. The original work relied
on material in the public domain and it is likely that other
cases and incidents exist but are not in the public domain.
These, it is thought, would include defects in cementation,
defective welding or screwing which were detected early
(during tests performed after drilling or after solution-
mining was completed) and repaired; or the migration of
ﬂuids through the cemented annulus, which were collected
at ground level and treated. Such incidents, which are part
of routine operation and creation of a cavern, are not widely
reported in the literature. The table is, however, likely to
cover the most signiﬁcant incidents in the history of storage
salt caverns worldwide (except for ex-USSR, for which
public information is scarce).
The featured incidents (casing leaks) are relatively few,
when it is borne in mind that more than 2000 salt storage
caverns have been operated successfully and without inci-
dent, sometimes for more than 50 years. Two casualties
have arisen (at Hutchinson) and several hundred people
have been evacuated during incidents. These are too many,
however, the numbers are extremely small when compared
to the toll resulting from above-ground tanks accidents that
would be the alternative storage option for liquids and gas
(Evans, 2007). From the perspective of safety, underground
storage beneﬁts from several intrinsic advantages (no oxy-
gen is available underground; high ﬂuid pressures are the
normal state underground, sensitivity to terrorist activities
or other acts of aggression is low).
However, lessons must, and can be, drawn to prevent
further accidents.
4 Factors inﬂuencing the occurrence
of a casing leak
The analysis of the leak mechanisms identiﬁed in the
11 cases previously analyzed enables to identify some com-
mon patterns. In the following the onset and nature of a
breach (Sect. 4.1), the development of a leak (Sect. 4.2),
consequences at ground level and monitoring-prevention
are discussed (Sect. 4.3). These three successive steps are
represented in Figure 13.
4.1 Onset of a breach
4.1.1 Leak initiation
In most incidents, a breach (and leakage) is created through
a steel casing at a depth where the well completion com-
prises a single cemented casing (‘‘single barrier’’). It is note-
worthy that in the oldest wells, the depth of the
penultimate casing shoe was shallow, and a single casing
formed more than 50% of the total length. In the accidents
described here, depths of the two last cemented casings
were 35.5 m and 410 m at Mineola; 212 m and 1086.6 m
at Epe; 823 m and 1737 m at Eminence; 92.1 m and
728.4 m at Teutschenthal (Fig. 14).
The breach may result from physico-chemical phenom-
ena (internal and external corrosion), or in faulty screwed
or welded connection between two consecutive pipes. How-
ever, external mechanical phenomena may also contribute
to the creation of a breach. At Hutchinson, a somewhat
exceptional case, an LPG storage well on abandonment
was plugged and cemented. When required for later natural
gas storage, the well had been drilled-out. A slice was cut in
the steel casing during drilling.
Deformation of the salt mass (or, more generally, the
rock formation) is a more generic cause. Two basic cases
Fig. 10. Examples of failures detected by the video inspection. From left to right: Circumferential fracture of the pipe body, of the
threaded coupling, and thread jump-out. From Osnes et al. (2007).
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can be distinguished, depending on whether the casing is
subject to excessive tensile or shear stresses.
In the ﬁrst case, the last cemented casing shoe is close to
the cavern roof (the ‘‘chimney’’ or ‘‘neck’’ below the casing
shoe is not very tall). In the case of Eminence, cavern creep
closure was rapid in this region of the well, because the cav-
erns were deep, and/or because cavern roof was ﬂat, a shape
that generates large vertical strains, as in the case of Boling
wells #1, 2 and 4. In Boling well #3 the last casing shoe was
anchored much higher above the cavern roof and the well
experienced no leak (Fig. 9). In both the Eminence and Bol-
ing cases, large vertical strains led to casing overstretching
and failure.
To a certain extent, the Epe case also belongs to the ten-
sile failure type, however overstretching took place at much
shallower depth. Breach creation is believed to originate in
a large overall subsidence, which was initiated by and as a
result of cavern convergence. This led to a sharp contrast in
vertical deformations above and below the penultimate cas-
ing shoe, where the breach appeared. At Teutschenthal,
two stages were recognised in the leak development. The
initial leak rate was slow, perhaps over many years, or even
dozens of years, during which time gas accumulated in a
30-m thick layer whose thickness increased by half a metre;
in this layer the casing, strongly bonded to the rock
mass, became overstretched and at one point it experienced
tensile failure, leading to the formation of a much larger
‘‘secondary’’ breach, which allowed higher leak rates. One
hour later, ethylence and water mix blew out at ground
surface.
In the second case, due to tectonic deformation inside a
salt dome, large differential movements develop, including
horizontal differential (shear) displacements between two
levels, the mechanical properties to which are in sharp con-
trast (for instance, salt top and caprock). The casing, which
is strongly bonded to each of these two levels, experiences
shear failure (this is likely to have happened at Clute). This
interpretation is conﬁrmed by several incidents (the conse-
quences of which were small) such as the failure of casings
at caprock depth at the West-Hackberry oil storage facility
(Sobolik and Ehgartner, 2012).
There is no well-documented example in which a leak
clearly starts at the depth of the last-cemented casing shoe,
which often is considered to be a weak point from the per-
spective of cavern tightness. For instance, at Boling,
breach(es) were close to, but above the casing shoe point.
To summarize the main ﬁndings, two likely causes –
which do not exclude one another, and do not exclude a
combination with other causes – appear. In all the cases,
a breach is created in a zone where well completion includes
a single casing. Except for the Hutchinson case (the breach
was created when re-drilling an abandoned well), ﬁve cases
are related to a structural cause: Eminence, Boling, Clute,
Teutschenthal and Epe cases, with proven or suspected
excess tensile stress experienced by the casings. In the
Eminence, Boling, Clute and Epe cases, this is, or is sus-
pected to be, due to salt creep dragging down the casings.
In the Teutschenthal escape, this was due to a small leak
that accumulated over a caprock, creating a local uplift.
We note that phenomena are relatively slow to occur and
if a tightness test had been conducted during commission-
ing of the caverns, it would not have detected a problem.
Therefore, a relationship exists with the ages of the wells.
4.1.2 Inﬂuence of well age
Table 4 illustrates that leakage occurrences happen several
dozens of years after well creation. This might be the time
needed for a breach in the casing to occur through corro-
sion; or excessive strains, tensile and shear stresses to build
Fig. 11. Observed and modelled casing deformations (from
Osnes et al., 2007). a) Comparison of measured casing separation
and predicted relative displacements between casing connections
from ﬁnite element modelling; b) vertical strains as a function of
depth in the salt near the centre lines of the Wilson storage
caverns predicted from ﬁnite element modelling.
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up through salt creep. In the US, the last incident occurred
in Texas in 2005 (where, since 1993, a double casing
anchored in the salt formation has been mandatory for
new caverns) at Boling, which had only one casing anchored
in the salt formation, and in 2001 in Kansas (where similar
regulations were enforced in 2003 following the Hutchinson
incident).
4.2 Leak development
In this section the factors which favour the development of
a leak are explored.
4.2.1 An intermediate outlet often is needed
A leak can only develop from a breach in the casing when a
pathway to an outlet exists, or is created. This outlet may
be ground level, a sufﬁciently porous and permeable under-
ground layer or structural zone (e.g., a fault or jointed rock
mass). Conversely, where no receptor horizon exists, or
when the cementing job was completely successful, leading
to a low permeability and a high gas entry pressure, a
breach in the casing does not result in a leak. This occurs
when, at breach depth, the rock mass is tight or deforms
plastically, tightening the bond between rock and the
cement job. In this respect, rocksalt (or clays/shales)
Fig. 12. Well scheme and pressure gradients of Epe S5 (Sto¨wer, in: Re´veille`re et al., 2017)
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Table 1. The main characteristics of Elk City, Oklahoma; Conway-Yoder ﬁeld, Kansas; Mt Belvieu, Texas; Mineola,
Texas.








Commissioning After 1954 600 caverns since 1951 1963 End of 50’s
Incident date
(1st noticed)






















Propane, or LPG Ethane, propane Propane
Last cemented
casing shoe






Breach depth Less than 365 m
deep
Shallow?
Pressure drop On 09/17/80
Mechanism A breach somewhere
between 365 m and
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Table 2. The main characteristics of Hutchinson, Kansas; Epe, Germany; Magnolia, Louisiana.
Hutchinson, Kansas Epe, Germany Magnolia, Louisiana
Cavern
information
Commissioning Drilled in the 80’s, and
abandoned. Re-opened
and ﬁlled with natural
gas in the 90’s




January 19, 2001 Feb 23, 2014 Dec 24, 2003















salt roof at 200 m (?)
Stored product Natural gas Oil Natural gas
Last cemented casing
shoe
900 at 238 m 11-3—400 at 1086.8 m 13-3—800
Penultimate cemented
c.s.
1600 at 212 m
Leak mechanism Breach depth 180 m  217 m 440 m
Pressure drop yes 0.36 MPa




fractured channels to the
brine aquifer below
Hutchinson, and to
ground levels through very






A ﬂaw in the casing at a
440-m depth, attributed
to poor welding job.
Impact at the
surface





107 m3 of gas migrate to
an aquifer layer, then to
ground level
Distance from wellhead 13 km 200 m







Measures taken Bottom plug set on
January 24. A video
detects the breach.
36 shallow boreholes are
drilled, eight of them ﬁnd








A bottom plug is set. 36
boreholes drilled to the
aquifer layer, 17 ﬁnd gas.
Video.
Remediation Rules rescinded An internal string
is set
Caverns ﬁlled with brine
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Table 3. The main characteristics of Eminence, Mississipi; Teutschenthal, Germany; Boling, Texas; Clute, Texas.





1971 1983. Caverns #1,
#2, #4
Leached out in 1961
Inccident date
(1st noticed)
December 26, 2010 March 29, 1988 December 24, 2003 December 1988
Geology Domal salt (Eminence
dome), 150-m thick
caprock, whose
roof is at 600 m.
Bedded salt. Top of salt
from 500 to 1000 m,
overlaid by a 300 m thick
clay layer and




190 m and above,






is likely to be active.
Stored product Natural gas Ethylene Natural gas Ethylene
Last cemented
casing shoe
13-3—8 at 1737 m 11-3—400 at 728.4 m 1066–1083 m. Very




2000 at 823 m 163—400 at 92,1 m
Leak
mechanism
Breach depth Connection at 111.8 m? Eight seen from video
logs between 3100 and
3400 ft
Pressure drop 2.46 MPa in 1 min on #3 From 7.5 MPa to 4 MPa Rapid pressure drop
over several weeks
Mechanism Likely factors: Fast cavern
closure rate (40% in one
year) frequent re-brining,
Ethylene accumulated in
a 100–140-m deep layer
overlain by a poorly
permeable, 25-m thick
layer. Layer uplift led to
overstretch of the
11-3—400 casing, which
breaks on March 29,
followed by a massive
leak. Ethylene leakage




down by the salt. This
was facilitated by the
































Continued on next page
Table 3. (Continued).







One hour after the
pressure drop, ﬁrst
ethylene + water blow-
out, followed by several
others, gas production
during several days, 60%
to 80% of cavern volume
is lost. Blow-out spots
aligned on parallel lines.




None None. Gas loss
estimated to be




The leak escaped from the




Twenty families during two
weeks
An 8 km2 zone
Emergency resp.
and remediation
Measures taken Partial venting 245 shallow
boreholes drilled 13
















March 19, 1990. Gas
was vented.
Remediation The four caverns are
abandoned
An 8-5—800 string is set in
the casing and the
annular space is
monitored.
Milling of the 11-3—400
casing on a 30-m
length, a 10-3—400 string





























exhibits very favourable properties; however, it does not
mean that no ﬂuid can migrate at the rocksalt-cement-steel
interfaces, as witnessed in the Eminence or Boling exam-
ples. We also note here that cases exist in both the storage
industry and in oil and gas production wells, where a leak
built up in the cemented annulus.
Generally speaking, however, in spite of many
advances (see Sect. 1), it is difﬁcult to guarantee cementa-
tion quality from wellhead to the last cemented casing
shoe.
In many cases, the leak ﬁnds an underground receptor,
i.e., a porous and permeable zone whose volume is large
enough to accommodate, at least for a period of time, a
large quantity of fugitive hydrocarbons. This outlet can
be at the same depth as the breach, for instance in the dome
caprock (Mont Belvieu, and probably Clute also) or, as in
Teutschenthal, in a sandstone layer, 30 m thick, below a
tight overburden layer.
However, in many other cases, receptor depth, where
leaking products accumulate, is shallower than the breach
depth itself. When the enclosing rock is tight and well
cementation is poor, hydrocarbons can migrate upward in
the cemented annulus between the steel casing and the
rock, until it encounters a permeable layer: at Hutchinson,
the point of escape and lateral migration was a thin, frac-
tured dolomitic horizon between two tight shale layers, into
which the gas migrated and moved updip, toward the town.
In most cases there is an accumulation phase during
which the escaped product progressively ﬁlls the receptor:
pressure increases to reach equilibrium with cavern pres-
sure. The products may remain in the outlet for a long per-
iod (Boling, Eminence where Cavern #7 leaks to the
caprock); or product pressure may build up to a level such
that a pathway is created to ground level (the outlet is the
Doxey shales at Elk City; and the brine aquifer at salt top
in the Conway case).
A poorly consolidated caprock above a salt dome, com-
posed of insoluble blocks left by dissolution (of evaporitic
Fig. 13. Schematic of leakage development cases with an intermediate outlet accumulation.
Fig. 14. Depths of the two last cemented casings and depth of
the breach through the tubing at Eminence, Epe, Teutschenthal
and Mineola.
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minerals), is favourable to the development of a leak, on
the one hand because it is the site of differential
displacements in the casing (Sect. 3.1) and, on the other
hand, because the caprock is per se a possible outlet.
Revision of regulations in Texas took this fact into account.
One might infer that leaks should be more frequent associ-
ated with salt dome storages rather than those in bedded
salts.
In fact, among the 12 cases presented above, 7 are
related to domal salts and 5 with bedded salt. Both cases
are found in sedimentary environment, in which successions
of tight and permeable layers commonly occur in the over-
burden. Mudstones and ﬁne-grained siltstone interbeds are
also found within massively bedded halite deposits. There-
fore, above a bedded salt formation, as above a salt dome,
intermediate aquifer layers (or, at least, more permeable
layers, as in the Hutchinson case or at Elk City) overlain
by a tighter overburden (Teutschenthal) are potential
candidates for hosting an accumulation of leaking hydrocar-
bons. In addition, in a salt dome, the overburden has been
deformed, which can aid fracture enhanced pathway devel-
opment within the overburden succession; the caprock often
is porous and permeable, making drilling and cementing a
more difﬁcult job.
4.2.2 A pressure differential is needed (leakage driving
force)
In addition to a breach in the casing and a receptor horizon,
development of a signiﬁcant leak requires a driving force,
i.e., a pressure differential. At any depth, except maybe
in the case of a natural gas storage when inventory is at a
minimum, pressure of the stored product is larger than pore
pressure in the rock mass (Fig. 15). The second condition
for leak development, that of a pressure gradient driving
the leakage ﬂow, is always fulﬁlled. Density of the stored
product plays a major role: the lighter the ﬂuid, the larger
the pressure differential between products pressure in the
well and ground water pressure at leak depth; it is larger
when the cavern is deeper and breach is shallower. This is
especially true in the case of natural gas: when the cavern
is full and gas pressure is at a maximum, it is higher than
geostatic pressure at almost any depth above the casing
shoe (Fig. 16); when a leak through a breach is created,
it can ﬁnd its way to ground level even through low
permeability layers. Density also plays a role when consid-
ering effects at ground level, see below.
When leaking product migrates through the cemented
annulus before reaching an outlet, pressure differential must
Table 4. Well ages in hydrocarbon storage leakage events.
Site Date drilled
(or debrined)








February 23, 1973 19 years? Leak likely started as early as
November 1972
Conway, Kansas Beginning 1951 After 1956 5–60 years The described accident in 2012
Yoder, Kansas – Idem June 30, 1980 30 years or more
Mont Belvieu,
Texas
1963 September 17, 1980
(wellhead pressure
drop)
17 years October 3, 1980 (ﬁre)





January 19, 2001 20 years
Epe, Germany 1980 February 23, 2014 34 years
Magnolia,
Louisiana
1970’s December 24, 2003 33 years 6 weeks after repressurization
Eminence,
Mississippi
1970–1973 26 December 2010 37–40 years





Fall 2005 c. 22 years
Clute, Texas Leached out in
1961
December 1988 c. 27 years
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be computed at receptor depth, where it is higher than at
breach depth. At Hutchinson, on January 14, 2001, gas
pressure was 4.76 MPa at casing shoe depth (238 m) and
only slightly lower (hence, larger than geostatic) at the
depth of the fractured layer through which gas escaped
and spread, allowing fast leak rates.
4.2.3 Wellhead pressure drops
In several occurrences (Epe, Teutschenthal, Eminence, Bol-
ing, Mont Belvieu and Hutchinson), a pressure drop was
observed at the wellhead:
d Epe (an oil storage), wellhead pressure dropped by
0.36 MPa 3 weeks before oil appeared at ground
surface.
d Teutschenthal (an ethylene storage), pressure
dropped from 7.5 MPa to 4 MPa: and ethylene blew
out at ground level 1 h later.
d Eminence (a natural gas storage), pressure dropped
by 2.56 MPa in 1 min.
d Boling (a natural gas storage), pressure drop was
spread over one week, although natural gas did not
appear at ground level and it is likely that gas found
a porous and permeable level in the salt overburden.
d Mont Belvieu (an LPG storage) pressure dropped
20 days before an explosion occurred at ground
surface.
d At Hutchinson (natural gas) the pressure dropped by
0.7 MPa follows the ﬁrst blow-out after 15 min; the
salty aquifer layer below the city of Hutchinson was
an intermediate outlet in which gas accumulated
and the pressure drop generated by the blow-out took
15 min to propagate to the S1 cavern, 13 km away.
No pressure drop is mentioned in other cases of
Section 2, but one was also observed in Regina South Gas
Storage Cavern No. 5 in Saskatchewan. The volume of this
cavern, leached out in 1983–1984, was more than
700 000 bbls (45 000 m3).
‘‘Maximum pressure was 3000 psi (20.5 MPa), a rela-
tively low value for a cavern whose roof depth was
5363 ft (1780 m). Roof salt thickness was 50 ft. The
ﬁnal developed roof position was higher than origi-
nally planned and located in a structurally unstable
area with many thin insoluble bands. In July 1989,
a 267-psig pressure drop occurred in this cavern fol-
lowing gas ﬁll up to 3000 psig. A rate of change in
pressure decline from the pressure vs. time graphs
used to monitor cavern operating condition suggested
the cavern roof had a leak away from the well bore
(Crossley, 1998).’’
A block fall generates no perennial gas pressure change;
the pressure drop must be due to a gas leak to a porous and
permeable layer above the salt roof.
Occurrence of a rapid pressure drop is especially puz-
zling in the case of a natural gas storage cavern. Gases
are much more compressible than liquids and a large gas
pressure drop requires the loss of a large fraction of the cav-
ern inventory. When V is the cavern volume, the pressure
drop due to a DV inventory loss is DP = DV/bV where b
is the factor of compressibility of the ﬂuid-ﬁlled cavern
(Be´rest et al., 1999); for a brine cavern, b = 4 · 104/
MPa; for a propane ﬁlled cavern, b = 103/MPa; for a
gas-ﬁlled cavern, b = 1/P where P is gas pressure, for
instance b = 101/MPa when gas pressure is 10 MPa. A
DP = 0.5 MPa pressure drop is generated by a 0.125%
inventory loss in a brine cavern; in a gas cavern, the same
pressure drop is generated by a 5% inventory loss – a huge
value. For this reason, a large pressure drop in a gas cavern
is possible only when the casing breach opens in a large,
porous and permeable volume (Mont Belvieu); or, long after
the breach is created, when the leaking gas reaches ground
level or a large porous and permeable receptor. At Hutchin-
son, the pressure drop was observed 15 min after gas
erupted in downtown Mont Belvieu – the time needed for
Fig. 16. A gas leaks from a breach in the casing. Gas migrates
through the cement and reaches a shallower aquifer layer, at
which point its pressure is much higher than in situ groundwater
pressure and even, in many cases, higher than geostatic pressure.
Fig. 15. Pressure distribution in the borehole in the case of a
natural gas storage (green line) and in the case of an LPG or oil
caverns (purple and red lines, respectively). Geostatic pressure
and typical water pressure in aquifer layers are also represented.
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the pressure drop in the salty aquifer belowMont Belvieu to
propagate to the cavern breach.
4.2.4 Products viscosity, capillary effects
Leakage can affect all types of stored ﬂuids, oil, natural gas,
ethylene or LPG. A low viscosity and a low entry pressure
in the rock formation favours leakage; as such, natural gas
(and, a fortiori, hydrogen) may be more likely to leak than
liquids. It is difﬁcult to quantify how much more likely to
leakage natural gas is as leak rate depends, in addition to
gas viscosity, on the way a leak path develops. Leak ﬂow
is likely to be bi-phasic ﬁrst, with a gas-water front inside
which capillary pressures slow down gas migration rate,
before a continuous path is created from breach to ground
level or to an intermediate receptor. The storage industry
(Crotogino, 1996) suggested empirical rules for conversion
of a gas leak (which can be easily measured during a tight-
ness test) into a liquid leak. Cases have been observed in
which the cavern is found to be somewhat leaky when the
testing ﬂuid is a gas, but tight when it contains a liquid
hydrocarbon. An example was at Magnolia, where the cav-
ern did not pass a Nitrogen Mechanical Integrity Test,
although the cavern had experienced no leakage issue when
the annular space was ﬁlled with a much more viscous diesel
oil (Bennett, 2009).
4.3 Eruption at ground level
4.3.1 The path toward ground level
One might think that a leak necessarily appears at ground
level near the wellhead, i.e., it follows the shortest path to
surface. This was clearly the case at Mineola, from which it
was inferred that the breach was shallow (the shoe of the
penultimate casing was only 35.5-m deep) and at Eminence
in 2011. However, in the general case, and especially when
hydrocarbons accumulate ﬁrst in an intermediate receptor
(a porous layer or caprock, e.g.,Hutchinson, Teutschenthal,
Clute, Elk City, Epe) the path found by the leak can be
complex and surface release somewhat distant; it is often
governed by geological features at shallow depth and is not
always the shallowest path along a vertical line. In such a
case, the blow-out can occur abruptly (Hutchinson, ElkCity,
Teutschenthal) and can be localized at a large horizontal
distance from the wellhead (600 m at Elk City, 50–200 m
at Teutschenthal, 500 m at Epe, and even up to 14 km in
the exceptional case ofHutchinson); and, probably at a point
where elevation is low (Mont Belvieu, Elk City).
AtHutchinson, general opinion is that a period of 8 years
was needed for gas to charge a thin, 13-km long sub-
horizontal fractured level before gas erupted in downtown
Hutchinson (several experts believe that ﬁlling took place
over a few days prior to the eruptions, however, this
conclusion is not fully substantiated by the (scarce) avail-
able information). At Teutschenthal, two distinct steps
were observed: ﬁrst, gas slowly ﬁlled an aquifer at
100-m–140-m depth, generating an uplift, and opening a
new breach in the severely stretched casing. This led to a sig-
niﬁcantly increased leak rate, a pressure drop (from 7.5 MPa
to 4 MPa) in the cavern and, 1 h later, a blow-out at ground
level. Both the cavern and the intermediate receptor were
vented by gas outﬂow at ground level, with ground uplift
vanishing.
4.3.2 Effects at ground level
The effects observed at ground level depend on many fac-
tors, among which are the nature of the stored gas, the con-
ﬁguration of shallow layers, and local topography. Two
types of effects can be observed: mechanical effects in case
of an abrupt blow-out (Teutschenthal, or Elk City, where
30-tons rock blocks were uplifted; Yoder where, however,
the propane/water jet was small) and chemical effects
(Mont Belvieu, where the gas exploded; Hutchinson, where
several explosions occurred). Importantly, no asphyxia case
has been reported in the incidents discussed here. It is
known from other types of incidents (wellhead failures,
which often lead to a loss of the full cavern inventory –
e.g., Moss Bluff) that a natural gas blow-out, with high
gas ﬂow rates (gas velocity is sonic at ground level) is not
an extremely severe hazard (except at the very beginning
of the process) as natural gas, lighter than air does not
spread laterally at ground level. In contrast, oil, and more
generally liquids, remain at ground level and generate
low-rate leaks (Epe), and do not burn in the absence of
an ignition source. This may not be true when hydrocar-
bons spread over a large area of ground, as, above the liquid
phase, a cloud forms containing the most volatile parts,
ignition of which is easier. Ethylene, which is stored in a
supercritical form, is gaseous at atmospheric pressure; its
density is close to that of air, with which it forms an explo-
sive mixture (however ethylene decomposes under the effect
of light). At Clute, ethylene remained conﬁned in the
caprock. At Teutschenthal, it appeared haphazardly at
ground level, however, topography and wind favoured dis-
persal. LPGs present a more difﬁcult problem. In the cav-
ern, they are liquid, but vaporize, at least partially, on
their way to ground level when their pressure becomes
lower than their vaporization pressure – at least when the
ﬂowrate is not too fast, and enough time is left for the rock
mass to provide the heat needed for phase change. In their
gaseous state, they are heavier than air (propane relative
density is 1.5) and, at ground level, they tend to remain
stagnant at low elevation points, or in building foundations
(Mont Belvieu, Elk City). At Elk City effects of the blow-
out were mechanical rather than chemical; measurements
proved that gas concentration at ground level was small
(less than 1%).
4.3.3 Actions taken after a leak is found
After the occurrence of a leak is established, its origin must
be conﬁrmed (it could result from a breach in a buried pipe-
line). Gas composition often is a clue. Drilling boreholes to
shallow ground water level, or to the level where products
circulate, allows venting the gas and understanding the
pathways followed by the leak (at Hutchinson, gas under-
ground pathways, which were complex, were identiﬁed
progressively; it was composed of several branches through
which gas ﬂowed toward the city).
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When the leaking cavern is identiﬁed, it must be vented,
when possible. At Boling, a temperature log identiﬁed the
depth at which the leak took place, as gas depressurization
creates a cold spot. Frequently, a plug is set in the wellbore,
as deep as possible and hopefully below the leak level. A
video log often assists in detecting this level, especially when
the rupture was created by excessive tension on the cemen-
ted casing, or re-entry operations during well conversion
damaged the casing (Hutchinson).
5 General lessons learned from case analysis
for well monitoring
5.1 Pressure monitoring
Pressure monitoring at cavern wellhead is necessary; at
Mont Belvieu, this monitoring provided a warning, 15 days
before the blow-out. However, in most cases a pressure drop
was not observed, or was observed too late, or even observed
after the blow-out (Hutchinson), when the leak path was
already fully developed. In principle, careful monitoring of
the wellhead pressure over a long period should provide a
warning; however, in a natural gas storage, the stored pro-
duct is so compressible that pressure changes resulting from
a leak are exceedingly small, especially when the cavern
experiences frequent injection/withdrawal, the cumulative
effects of which generate large uncertainties. In a strategic
oil storage, the inventory of which changes little, a better
resolution can be anticipated but important efforts must
be made, in terms of accuracy and interpretation, to reach
an acceptable resolution (Colcombet and Nguyen, 2013).
5.2 Well completion
The role of wellbore completion is extremely important. It
was observed that the combination of a ﬂat cavern roof
and a short chimney leads to tensional stresses and stretch-
ing of the casing, especially when cavern creep closure is
fast. In many of the described cases, a large difference can
be observed between the depth of the deepest and penulti-
mate cemented casing. In other words, between the shoes of
these two casings, a single ‘‘barrier’’ (i.e., a casing cemented
to the rock formation) can be found: a breach through the
steel casing opens directly to the rock mass. It is interesting
to note that, in most cases, when repairing a leak, an inner
steel tube is added to form, with the preexisting casing, an
annular space the bottom to which is closed; this annulus is
ﬁlled with water whose pressure is monitored at ground
level – a way of creating a ‘‘second barrier’’ which did not
exist in the initial design. Such a completion (an internal
tube delimiting a monitoring annulus plugged at its bot-
tom) has been mandatory in France and Germany for nat-
ural gas storages and the trend in Europe is to equip new
liquid storage caverns with such a system (it is a require-
ment under Dutch mining law, Koopmans et al., 2014).
For many years in Texas, Louisiana and Kansas (three
states in which can be found the majority of US salt cavern
storages), State regulation has required that new caverns
have two cemented casings, anchored in the salt formation.
In addition, a tightness test is mandatory at least every
5 years, which covers the case of old caverns which are
not equipped with a double casing.
5.3 Mechanical Integrity Tests (MITs)
Although the number of storage caverns in operation
increases, fewer and fewer accidents are occurring. Several
reasons exist for this. Recent caverns are equipped with a
double casing anchored to the salt formations, or a
water/brine-ﬁlled annular space. Both new and old caverns
are now tested using the Nitrogen Leak Test (NLT) and
Liquid Leak Test (LLT) methods. The former consists of
injecting nitrogen into the annular space, the latter instead
of nitrogen, a liquid hydrocarbon is injected. Salt caverns
present a remarkable advantage (when compared to
depleted reservoirs or, more generally, oil and gas ﬁelds):
borehole tightness can be tested, as the borehole opens in
a closed ‘‘container’’ (the cavern itself), which is almost per-
fectly tight. Typically, the NLT consists of injecting nitro-
gen into the annular space slightly below the last
cemented casing shoe. A logging tool is used to measure
the brine/nitrogen interface location. At least two measure-
ments, generally separated by 3 days, are undertaken.
Upward movement of the interface is deemed to indicate
a nitrogen leak. Pressures are measured at ground level,
and temperature logs are recorded to allow estimating
effects such as thermal expansion and compressibility and
enable precise back-calculation of nitrogen seepage. MITs
are mandatory every ﬁve years in most US states and coun-
tries. Fail/Pass criteria have been proposed by the SMRI
(Crotogino, 1996). Space does not permit expanding on
these notions here, but MITs – and especially NLTs – are
the most signiﬁcant prevention tool in the cavern industry.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, based on a study funded by the SMRI, 12 inci-
dents involving product leaks through the cemented casing
of salt storage cavern wells are described. Their causes have
been analyzed and general lessons drawn, which are infor-
mative for not only storage caverns, but also oil and gas ﬁeld
wells. They prove that experience, dissemination of new
techniques and best practices, and advances in well design
(double casing) and testing (MITs), leads to an ongoing
reduction in the frequency and severity of incidents.
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